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Propriété intellectuelle
From Empire to Marketplace
Agfa and the Rebuilding of the German Photography Industry after 1945
Anaïs Feyeux
Translation : James Gussen
1 The relationship between the photography industry and photographers is one that is
rarely described. From the product of the lab to the professional photographer, from the
mass-produced camera to the amateur,  and from the paper factory to the artist,  the
economic  chain  traces  relationships  of  interdependence.  Certain  historical  upheavals
permit us to observe the alliances that constitute a photographic sphere. This is the case
with the rebirth of  post-totalitarian Germany;  the photography industry was directly
involved in the ‘economic miracle’ that enabled the reconfigured Germany to join the
group of the world’s richest countries. Initially, however, there was nothing to suggest
that photography stood poised to regain its former status as one of the leading sectors of
the  German  economy.  Factories  had  been  bombed,  and  production  sites  were  often
separated between East and West. Germans themselves were no longer in a position to
take  photographs,  their  cameras  having  been either  destroyed  or  requisitioned,  and
professional photographers were limited to taking ‘passport photographs.’1 But despite
the stranglehold on the domestic economy at the hands of the occupying forces, German
firms put new business strategies in place. 
2 Located at the intersection of high-tech industry and an emerging leisured society, the
photography sector was emblematic of German reconstruction. It bore witness to the end
of the alliance between politics and industry under National Socialism and exemplified
the  birth of  a  new alliance  between industry  and culture.  How was  this  new model
established? This far-reaching transformation was brought about by the unification of the
hitherto scattered branches of the photography industry and involved an investment on
the part of this economic sector in establishing a framework for promoting the medium.
The inception of the trade fair Photokina in Cologne in 1950, which brought together
industrial products and photography exhibitions, attests to this close link between the
photography industry and photographic practice. But this phenomenon was by no means
the consequence of any sort of determinism; rather, it was the result of the energetic
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efforts  of  individuals,  among them Bruno Uhl,  who was,  at  the  time,  the  marketing
director of Agfa.2 Through his involvement in various initiatives in the early 1950s, Uhl
became one of the pillars of the photography sector. 
 
An Industry in Ruins and under External Control
3 Before the war, Agfa, like Zeiss Ikon, had adopted a strategy of dividing its activities
among different  plants.  Zeiss  Ikon’s  Dresden and Berlin  factories  were  destroyed by
bombs during the war. In Agfa’s case, after 1945, its camera factory was in Munich in the
American  zone,  the  paper  factory  in  Leverkusen  in  the  British  zone,  and  the  film
production facility in Wolfen in the Soviet zone. As a result, no integrated production
capabilities remained. Following the Potsdam Conference in July 1945, the break up of the
company, due to the geographic segregation of its production plants, was accompanied by
the Allies’ decision to break up the industrial cartels that had operated under National
Socialism. Thus, IG Farben (IG for interessengemeinschaft, or syndicate), the world leader in
the chemical industry, was dismantled.3 
4 Of  the  two  hundred  companies  controlled  by  the  cartel,  only  those  with  no  direct
connection to Nazi crimes were allowed to survive. Agfa was one such firm, but now
operating under forced autonomy. The firm found itself in a difficult position; it  had
effectively been dismantled, and on two discrete levels: that of its personnel, with the
destruction of production sites and their separation among the various different zones of
occupation; and a higher, more overarching level related to the national economy, with
the prohibition of industrial associations (cartels), which had hitherto worked efficiently.
To further accentuate this decline and preserve their grip on the economy, the Allies
chose to exact reparations in the form of monetary or material levies from the various
firms  based  on  their  geographic  location.4 Any  commercial  exchange  between  the
different zones of occupation was forbidden. The companies were obliged to function as
autonomous structures – this was the case for Agfa’s Leverkusen and Munich factories,
whose directors were prohibited from contacting each other. 
5 In  addition  to  cutting  off  cooperation  between  the  production  sites,  the  Allies  also
revoked German patents. Research results became public and could now be exploited by
foreign firms.5 Delegations of foreign competitors visited German factories to study their
facilities. From June 29, 1945, representatives from DuPont (United States) visited Agfa’s
Leverkusen factory,  followed by those  of  the British company Ilford.  Russian,  Czech,
French, and Chinese commissions also visited the sites.6 In 1945, German companies were
placed under the authority of the occupying forces. In the case of the British zone, its
commander functioned as the director of these companies, and one of his officers
supervised the photography industry.7
6 Under theses circumstances, the factories of a single firm attempted to diversify in the
West, while in the East after 1946 they were nationalized and converted into Soviet stock
companies (or SAGs).8 The senior executives of the firms that had fallen under Soviet
domination began to emigrate to the Western zones in 1945. Bruno Uhl of Agfa left Berlin
and, in his own words, rescued ‘critical documents, important correspondence, dealer
files, etc.’9 Together with a number of colleagues from other departments – technology,
Europe,  and  the  transatlantic  region –  he  fled  to  Leverkusen,  while  in  Munich  the
Americans  appointed  Dr. Grieme,  the  former assistant  to  the  director  in  Berlin,  as
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director of the Agfa camera factory. The factory producing film, however, was still in
Wolfen, in the Eastern zone. 
7 In 1945, when Uhl took over the leadership of the Agfa paper facility in Leverkusen, the
offices were in the basement, and he, acting as marketing director worked in a little room
under the stairs.10 And yet, as early as August 1945 Uhl made plans to construct a film
factory in Leverkusen to replace the production of that in Wolfen. To avoid a veto by the
British authorities, these plans went forward in secret. In 1949, the Leverkusen factory
produced its first rolls of film,11 demonstrating the fierce determination of the company’s
directors to offer a complete range of products and services. This quest to manufacture a
comprehensive line of photography-related products enabled Agfa to assume the status of
a major brand in a specialized domain, in contrast to IG Farben. 
8 Uhl also endeavored to create connections between the factories in the different zones.
Beginning in 1945, the segregation of the Western and Eastern zones prohibited any joint
commercial operations between them, but despite that, the new director of Agfa’s Munich
factory invited Uhl  to  take over  the leadership of  the company,  dividing it  between
Leverkusen and Munich, that is, within the limits of the Western zone. Uhl declined and,
in an effort to formulate a common strategy, began to correspond in secret with Hans von
Werthern, the company’s former president, who had settled in Frankfurt in the American
zone.12 Uhl’s business plan for Agfa went beyond the Leverkusen factory, and he would go
on to consolidate the company by diversifying its  products  and setting up offices  in
various zones of occupation, in direct contravention of the economic laws established by
the Allies.
 
From Monopoly to Marketplace
9 Despite the impossibility of trade between the different occupied zones, even within the
bounds of a single company, the industry got back on its feet quickly. On May 4, 1945, the
manufacturing of photographic paper resumed in Leverkusen. The same year, production
of cameras was relaunched in Munich, in a factory where more than sixty percent of the
machines and installations had been destroyed.13 Production of Agfacolor film resumed in
1945–46. But these products primarily went to the occupying troops or were destined for
export. In 1947, almost 90 percent of the output was exported. 
10 Faced  with  the  foreign  market’s  hold  over  German  industry,  Uhl  contacted  the
manufacturers in the British zone to discuss what steps should be taken. In an effort to
construct a stable and autonomous economic sector independent of foreign domination,
an  association  that  would  group  together  photography-related  industries  appeared
necessary. Uhl went ahead by stages. On October 23, 1946, in Leverkusen, he organized
the first congress of photographic equipment manufacturers located in the British zone.
This  meeting  marked the  birth  of  the  Association of  Manufacturers  of  Photographic
Articles (Verein der Fabrikanten Photographischer Artikel). Bruno Uhl was appointed its
president.14 Despite the ban on forming cartels, this association was able to circumvent
the rules by adopting appropriate terminology. 
11 In reality, this economic unification openly led to a horizontal integration that, while not
institutionalized,  with its  lack of  competition recalled the economic structure of  the
totalitarian regime after 1933, but with one important difference: until  this time, the
photography industry had developed by joining cartels made up of firms from different
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fields. The Agfa photographic equipment company had belonged to the IG Farben group
of chemical companies. IG Farben comprised firms with similar areas of expertise and a
common need for high-tech engineering. At the end of the war, the senior executives of
IG Farben, who had been close to the Nazi regime, were placed on trial. In addition to
serving  as  an exemplary  condemnation of  the  close  links  between industrialists  and
National Socialist politicians, this trial enabled the Allies to weaken German economic
institutions that had competed with American companies during the war. The German
economic system was now no longer based on specific fields of expertise such as chemical
engineering (in the case of IG Farben). It had to find a new development plan. Constrained
by the autonomy imposed upon them and the reality of foreign competition, German
firms no longer entered into partnerships based on common areas of expertise. They
formed associations based on the markets they sought to reach. The economic unification
of  the  American  and  British  zones  in  October  1946  permitted  the  Association  of
Manufacturers  of  Photographic  Articles  to  become  active  in  the  American  zone  the
following year. The French zone of occupation joined this Bizone in August 1948, turning
it into a Trizone. But Agfa had anticipated this unification. The first joint congress of the
photographic equipment manufacturers of all the Western zones was held in Frankfurt on
January  9,  1948:  even  before  the  monetary  reform,  the  photography  industry  had
succeeded in uniting itself.
12 On June 20, 1948, the economic unification of the three Western zones culminated in a
monetary reform and the birth of the Deutsche Mark. At this time, Bruno Uhl founded
Apho (the Arbeitsausschuss der deutschen Photowirtschaft, or Task Force on the German
Photography Industry). It was made up of the presidents of all the economic associations
that were involved, in some way, in the field of photography: photographic equipment
manufacturers,  wholesalers,  and retailers  as  well  as  photographers,  laboratories,  and
photocopy firms. Joining this committee were other associations with related interests,
such as those of amateur photographers and the film industry. Chaired by Uhl, Apho was
conceived as a forum in which all of the issues and events that had some bearing on the
photography sector could be considered and discussed. This body united the common
interests of all the companies whose businesses involved photography. Cooperation was
no longer  purely  horizontal,  as  in  the  Association of  Manufacturers  of  Photographic
Articles of 1946, but vertical as well; it went beyond the status of a cartel to approach that
of a Konzern. 
13 Within three years,  Uhl had brought together all  of the branches of West Germany’s
photography industry, to the point of creating a unified photography sector capable of
responding to the economic challenges confronting it. Until 1948, sales were aimed at
foreign markets and dependent on orders from abroad. The photographic industry led all
other industrial sectors of the German economy in terms of exports.15 By consolidating,
the German market now became an economic player. As a result of this transformation,
the photography sector, like much of the West German economy during these years of
reconstruction,  was able to move from a sector of industry-based cartels,  to a sector
based on service-oriented consortiums. The potential market became the dominant factor
in this process of economic integration, and the movement toward a service sector helped
cultivate  customer  loyalty,  which  had  become  unpredictable  in  the  face  of  foreign
competition. 
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The Strategy of Recapitalization 
14 With the monetary reform of 1948, the development of a domestic market was realizable.
Until then, the state of deprivation in which the population lived, the cost of reparations,
and the stranglehold of the occupying forces had made the development of a domestic
market in Germany impossible and had forced German firms to turn to export as their
primary focus. With the economic miracle engendered by the 1948 reform, they were able
to gain access to an enormous market share.  As a result  of  the war and subsequent
requisitions, two thirds of the cameras belonging to Germans had been lost.16 Yet in 1947,
only 5 to 10 percent of cameras produced in Germany went to the German population.17
Barter  and black-market  economies  developed.  After  1948,  demand for  photographic
equipment blossomed, and the industry responded by selling pre-war models. Old Agfa
camera bodies were sold for 9.90 DM.18 In the following years, manufacturers adopted a
strategy of minor modifications and produced a wide range of accessories, trying in this
way to keep their cameras attractive as well as to cultivate a loyal base of customers who
they hoped would then turn to more expensive models. Sensing the possibility of a new
market,  Apho, at the instigation of Bruno Uhl,  emphasized the cultural aspect of the
photographic  medium,  which  the  Rheinischer  Merkur described  in  1952  as  the  ‘great
passion of our time.’19
15 How would  it  be  possible  to  develop  and  promote  a  culture  of  photography  whose
institutions dated from before the war and whose new practitioners were still so few in
number? It was in this transitional period that Agfa pursued its program of recapitalizing
financially troubled institutions on the one hand, while creating an innovative framework
for photography on the other. This ambition, however, did not immediately meet with
success. In his speech before the Federation of German Industries on January 9, 1948, Uhl
spoke  of  mobilizing  Apho  around  four  different  events  and  activities,  all  of  them
economic as well as cultural: a photography trade fair, a specialized press, a school, and
photography itself. 20 The trade fair and the magazines were intended to help disseminate
the technological advances of the photography industry as well as to serve as vehicles for
advertising.  Uhl  wished  to  create  two  magazines:  a  trade  magazine  for  the  entire
photography sector and a large-circulation amateur magazine, first in German, then in
English and French and even in  Spanish,  whose  mission would be  to  ‘bring German
photography to the entire world.’21 The goal of this amateur magazine would be to turn
weekend photographers into loyal users of the products of German industry, creating a
new market.22 Both plans fell through, but the various efforts demonstrate the underlying
desire  to  create  specifically  photographic  institutions  and  to  spark  an  independent
process of reconstruction in this domain.
16 In the early 1950s, thanks to Bruno Uhl,  Agfa came to the aid of financially troubled
organizations.  The  Bayerische  Staatslehranstalt  für  Lichtbildwesen  (Bavarian  State
Institute  for  Photography),  a  public  photography  school  in  Munich,  was  in  serious
financial straits. Although it was the only public photography school in West Germany at
the time, neither the Bavarian government nor the Ministry of Culture provided it with
sufficient  funding  to  cover  its  operating  expenses.23 The  administration  found  itself
compelled to solicit industry for donations. Agfa offered financial support to the school
and required, in exchange, that it adopt the company’s technology by setting up an Agfa
color photography studio.24 
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17 The  situation  was  similar  for  the  Society  of  German  Photographers  (Gesellschaft
Deutscher Lichtbildner, or GDL). This association of professional photographers was one
of  the  only  organizations  that  had  not  disbanded  under  National  Socialism.  Until
February 1948 and the death of its  president,  Franz Grainer,  as well  as that of  Hugo
Erfurth, the president of the jury, no real efforts were made to revive it,25 since Grainer
was busy with the Munich school and Erfurth was elderly. It was not until July 14, 1948,
that the GDL held its first postwar meeting in Düsseldorf and elected a new executive
committee. It planned, at the time, to pursue a ‘cultural mission’ by exhibiting the works
of  its  members.  Left  with  a  sizeable  budget  deficit  after  its  first  large  exhibition in
Cologne in 1949, it borrowed money from Agfa, which stipulated, in return, the right to
use the photographs of some of its members for advertising purposes.26 In 1951, Agfa
invited  the  organization’s  members  to  take  classes  using the  Agfacolor  process  and
created an award for color photography. 
18 Agfa’s support for the older generation of photographers, who still controlled the existing
organizations,  brought  it  the  backing  of  photographic  institutions  that  were  stable,
smoothly functioning, and widely known in the cultural realm. It also introduced the
photographic industry into a highly circumscribed field, conferring a historical sanction
upon not only the photography sector, which acquired intellectual legitimacy, but also
upon the old institutions themselves, which acquired new vitality at the very moment
when they were suffering from their strong association with National Socialism and a
discredited  economic  system.  But  in  financing  these  two  (public  and  professional)
structures, Agfa also encountered a problem. The Munich school and the GDL – both of
them institutions that had been active under National  Socialism – were guardians of
photographic  conservatism,  not  exponents  of  the  modernity  that  the  photography
industry sought to promote. While it was appropriate to rescue these two organizations
in the name of getting the German photography industry back on an even keel – they
were the only major West German institutions in existence at the time – it  was also
imperative that new structures be created that would be better able to fuel the German
revival.
 
Financing New Cultural Institutions
19 In the early 1950s, Apho launched a number of new cultural initiatives intended to better
support  the  reemerging  photography industry.  A  photography trade  fair,  specialized
magazines, and a school were now gradually established. The amateur magazine Photo-
Magazin was created in April 1949, and Bernd Lohse, in the first issue’s letter from the
editor,  describes its ‘primary and overriding mission’  to ‘present exemplary works of
photography  from  a  dignified  nation.’27 This  was  the  first  time  that  the  postwar
photography industry had emphasized the notion of a unified ‘country’ with national
characteristics. 
20 Initially, in addition to supporting the state photography school in Munich, the magazine
also championed the new German avant-garde photography with articles  on the two
groups  Fotoform  and  Subjektive  Fotografie,  often  written  by  the  photographers
themselves.  In  1952,  however,  Photo-Magazin began  to  distance  itself  from
experimentation and to support a practice that was more direct and closer to amateur
photography.  In  response  to  the  exhibitions  The  German  Photoreports (Die  Deutschen
Bildberichte) and The Photographs of Life at Photokina in 1952, the March issue featured an
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article entitled ‘A Photographer Like You and Me,’ which urged German amateurs to turn
toward a more spontaneous type of photography. The preference for a photograph made
from real life – in contrast to the typical artist photograph of the time, which was highly
formalized and carefully constructed – may be explained by the desire to rally amateur
photographers around a practice and shared vision that were close to their aspirations of
the time. It  also encouraged a sense of personal investment in the effort to promote
photography and leant  an intellectual  legitimacy to their  practice,  a  legitimacy that
served both the clients and the industrial firms. 
21 Photokina was the focal  point  of  the expanded photography sector of  these postwar
years,  when there  was  still  a  sense  of  solidarity  among the various  branches  of  the
medium, and before the rifts of the late 1950s. Like Photo-Magazin, this trade fair owed its
existence to Apho and Bruno Uhl’s  vision.  Its  purpose was to replace the traditional
market that had existed before the war. It was also meant to act as a substitute for the
Photo-Kino-Optik-Messe (Photography, Film, and Optics Exposition) of Leipzig, now in the
Soviet  zone,  which  had  resumed  in  1946  but  from  which  West  German  firms  were
excluded. In 1948, Uhl had emphasized that the German photography sector needed a
public presentation of photographic equipment. The trade fair was initially intended to
circulate,  both  within  Germany  and  abroad,28 but  as  its  first  edition  of  1950,  which
featured  289  exhibitors  from  German  industry,  was  so  successful  –  75,000  visitors,
including 6,000 foreigners attended the event29 – it didn’t seem worth the additional cost.
Uhl wished to complement the industrial fair with cultural exhibitions in order to attract
new  amateur  photographers.  Photokina  was  intended  both  to  document  the
reconstruction of German photography as well as to show visitors the broad potential of
the medium. The 1950 fair presented both the German avant-garde group Fotoform as
well as an exhibition on the use of photography in the sciences and a visual introduction
entitled People Who Take Photographs Get More out of Life (Wer photographiert hat mehr vom
Leben). The organizers revealed a strong interest in amateur photographers, whom they
regarded as the driving force behind a kind of photography understood not merely as a
pastime, but as a way of life, one that was quintessentially contemporary and embodied
the three great interests of the day: art, science, and leisure. 
22 While the GDL consisted of professional photographers who were often conservative in
their practice, the German Photographic Society (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Photographie,
or DGPh) founded in May 1951, at the same time as the second Photokina, saw itself as ‘an
inclusive community that supplements and enriches the purely technical and economic
aspects  of  photography  by  adding  a  conceptual  dimension.’30 This  society  sought  to
provide a forum, a specialized library, and a collection, as well as to organize exhibitions
and maintain  contacts  with  similar  organizations  abroad.  Thirty  public  figures  were
invited to participate in the constitutive assembly, all  of them from the photography
world,  including  directors  of  associations  and  magazines  as  well  as  photographers.31
Bruno Uhl was the sole potential  financial  backer to be invited,  and indeed the only
representative of the entire photography industry. That he alone was extended such an
invitation is indicative of the extent to which he dominated the economic world of West
German photography at the time. 
23 Although the society did appeal to Agfa for financial assistance from time to time, it
generally kept its distance from the business world. In October 1951, for example, Uhl
sponsored the exhibition Subjektive Fotografie in Cologne. Agfa’s financial support for this
event  was  accompanied  by  advertising  and  magazine  articles  commissioned  by  its
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director and carried by large-circulation German photography magazines such as Foto
Prisma, Photo-Magazin, and Photo-Presse.32 As it had previously done for the GDL, Agfa of
Leverkusen came to the assistance of the DGPh when the latter found itself in financial
difficulty. In 1952, one year after the founding of the Society, Agfa twice provided it with
5,000 DM to cover its debts.33 From this point on, the DGPh, which had initially sought to
avoid close links to industry, found itself dependent on a single source of funding: Agfa in
the person of Bruno Uhl.
24 In  1952,  Uhl  was  at  the  center  of  the  broad-based  revival  of  the  West  German
photography industry, which he promoted by financing photo graphy classes,  creating
associations,  launching  magazines,  and  founding  the  largest  cultural  and  industrial
photography trade fair in the world. His desire to found a specialized public school, a
dream he had harbored since the late  1940s,  was  now within reach.  Agfa  played an
important role in the choice of Cologne as the favored location for this school;34 Cologne
was already the site of Photokina and the DGPh, and it was only fifteen kilometers from
Agfa’s corporate headquarters in Leverkusen. Uhl wanted to see this new school become a
training center for all the professionals in the field, from photojournalists to scientific
photographers  and  dealers  –  demonstrating  once  again  his  desire  for  an  expanded
photography sector. However, because there was not a prominent artist on the faculty, it
became focused primarily on the training of photographic equipment dealers.
 
An Opportune Alliance of Art and Culture
25 Commercial interests were not the sole factors in this rapid reconstruction of the German
photography industry; the issue of national pride cannot be ignored. It reemerged around
two  poles:  avant-garde  artistic  production  and  the  utopian  idea  of  an  art  form  for
everyone. It is in the alliance of the artistic and the amateur that the originality of the
postwar photography world stands out most clearly, and this alliance was a product of
Agfa’s strategy. 
26 Certainly, by opening laboratories and financing color photography classes at the public
photography school in Munich, Agfa hoped to find new markets for the Agfacolor process,
which dated from 1936. Competition from foreign firms – initially American companies
such as Kodak and later their Japanese counterparts – was raising fears of a drop in
exports.  In  response,  Agfa  sought  to  retain  its  virtual  hegemony  over  the  domestic
market by producing cameras that were increasingly easy to use, in hopes of spawning
new  users  among  amateurs  and  the  younger  generation.  To  promote  student
photography,  the  manufacturer  set  up  photography  labs  in  schools  and  started  a
magazine called Jugend Photographiert (The Young Take Photographs), both of which were
financed by Agfa and the Society for the Advancement of Photography (Gesellschaft zur
Förderung der Photographie, or GFP).35 These efforts were accompanied by competitions
and by exhibitions organized to coincide with Photokina. Alongside the economic aspect,
there was now the utopian idea of a practice of photography that was an integral part of
life, an attempt to turn ‘writing with light’ into a normal and natural component of the
consciousness of ordinary people.36
27 This turn toward nonprofessional photographers was also accompanied, in the late 1940s
and early 1950s, by support for artistic photography. With magazine articles and with
exhibitions such as Fotoform within the vast trade fair, Photokina in 1950, 1951, and 1952,
the  German  photography  industry  championed  a  national  brand  of  experimental
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photography.  This  photography  derived  from  the  German  modernism  of  the  1920s,
considered a historically legitimate era because it was the only democratic period before
the birth of the Federal Republic of Germany. A utopian vision of photography for all and
a universal language was reactivated in the 1950s along with experimental photography.
With  these  two  parameters  –  historical  sanction  and  ubiquitousness  –  which  were
accompanied by an aesthetic alignment with contemporary trends in painting such as art
informel,  West  German  postwar  photography  displayed  cultural  and  international
ambitions.  Photokina  and  the  participating  firms  were  well  served;  by  mounting
exhibitions of this photography, they were able to lay claim to the same qualities of
historical legitimacy, universalism, and an intellectual pedigree. This alliance between
industry and the avant-garde also served the photographers, giving them a venue in the
context of a prominent international event, an opportunity otherwise unavailable in West
Germany. 
28 As a result,  this photography,  very innovative for its  time,  enjoyed a high degree of
publicity and reached audiences as far away as Italy and the United States; it brought
Germany a new intellectual acceptance at the very time when the idea of constituting a
nation was first emerging in the West. The German industrial milieu, and above all Bruno
Uhl, recognized that for the economic recovery to last, it had to be sustained by national
pride. And that pride was born with the cultural and social ambitions of photography.
29 When  Uhl  retired  in  1955,  photography  in  Germany  had  been  rebuilt  and  unified,
economically as well as culturally. It had responded to the problems of the immediate
postwar  period  –  economic reconstruction,  the  creation  of  an  amateur  market,  and
cultural surplus value – with the real solutions of associations, a trade fair, and magazines
that reached a broad audience and participated in public discourse. The associations were
permanent and specialized, and they drew strength from the fact that the magazines
appeared on a regular schedule and were widely available throughout the entire country,
as well as from the cyclical and seductive, almost blockbuster character of the trade fair.
But as the industry grew increasingly dynamic, the solidarity of the various domains of
photography began to fray, as evidenced by the subdivision of the DGPh into a number of
discrete categories – education, art, history, medical photography, and technology. The
field was becoming specialized again or, at the very least, abandoning its utopian unity
and embracing distinctions. It was also becoming increasingly international in character.
From 1956, Photokina was funded by UNESCO. A new era began, centered around the
German-speaking world – West Germany, Switzerland, and Austria – with great figures
like Karl Pawek and the magazines Camera and Magnum. 
30 Finally, in an equally important development, the issue of the long-term trajectory of
photography was raised. A present, characterized by a concern with reconstruction, gave
way to a certain interest in historicization. In 1955, in what would be Bruno Uhl’s last
major   act,  Agfa  purchased  Eric  Stenger’s  collection  of  historical  photographs.37 A
consensus arose around the need for a museum of photography.38 The cultural awards
conferred by the DGPh upon Albert Renger-Patzsch in 1960 and August Sander in 1961
would ultimately cement this necessary connection between historical and contemporary
photography in late 1950s West Germany. 
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NOTES
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ABSTRACTS
The rapid growth of the Federal Republic of Germany has often been attributed exclusively to the
revival of its economy. The result has been to project the image of a country that, until the early
1960s, was overly prosaic and where art, predominantly abstract, was detached from the new
state’s political and structural concerns. Yet in the area of photography, the birth of Photokina in
Cologne in 1950 attests to the emergence of a close link between industry and photographic
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practice during the period of reconstruction. After 1945, a unified photography sector emerged
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